Director
Central
Intelligence

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Spain, NATO, and Western Europe

National Intelligence Estimate

Secret

NIE 27.1/20-84
12 March 1984

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/08 : CIA-RDP87T00126R000801080001-2

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SPAIN, NATO, AND WESTERN EUROPE

Information available as of 12 March 1984 was used in the preparation of this Estimate.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Spain's evolution from dictatorship to democracy has been accompanied by an active "Europeanism," symbolized by Madrid's eagerness to enter the European Community and its continued membership in NATO. Europe, however, is keenly aware of the costs of Spanish entry into the EC; and Prime Minister Gonzalez will be reluctant to commit Spain to the defense of a Europe from which it could be economically excluded. Choices over the next several years in Madrid and Brussels could determine whether Spain will participate fully in the mainstream of European politics—and whether "Europe" will end at the Pyrenees or at Gibraltar.

Gonzalez's pragmatic and moderate approach to domestic reform and the absence of a strong political opposition have enabled him to retain much of his preelection popular appeal, to help reconcile the military to his government, and to strengthen the prospects for continued political stability. Only an exceptional combination of crises—a serious surge in terrorism, the threat of secession by one or more of the nation's autonomous regions, a precipitate downturn in economic fortunes, and widespread social disorder—could provide pretext and motivation for a military effort to reverse the democratic process. Although we believe the chances of such a dramatic degeneration of Spanish political life are highly unlikely over the two- to three-year perspective of this Estimate, we cannot exclude the possibility of an abortive coup attempt by a coterie of captains or colonels such as occurred in 1981.

Violence in the Basque country and an ailing economy remain potential political vulnerabilities for Gonzalez. Although the separatist ETA (Basque Homeland and Liberty) retains the capability for antigovernment activities, including assassination attempts on key personalities, Madrid's policy of granting a measure of Basque autonomy coupled with tough antiterrorist actions and French cooperation in expelling ETA militants operating in southern France have done much to diminish the terrorist threat. Similarly, although inflation and unemployment rates are high, Gonzalez remains committed to a restrictive economic program aimed at reducing public spending, lowering inflation, and stimulating private investment; and Spain appears well positioned to profit from any sustained European economic recovery.

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Thus, neither terrorism nor economic decline, we believe, is likely adversely to affect Gonzalez's political fortunes or dampen his determination to pursue Spain's nascent Atlanticism.

The Socialist government has declared EC membership to be a major objective and, despite some impatience with the pace of negotiations, remains intent on entry by January 1986, prior to the scheduled legislative elections that year. There is, we believe, a better-than-even chance of completing the EC negotiations by early 1985. Gonzalez sees accession not only as a prerequisite for Spain's modernization, but also as recognition and, to some extent, a guarantee of the country's new democratic institutions. Madrid, however, will not pay an exorbitant price for EC membership and will not be willing to wait at Europe's doorstep indefinitely. Should the complexity of the issues and the clash of economic interests within the Community conspire to delay accession much beyond 1986, Gonzalez will be under severe pressure to suspend or abort the negotiations altogether. Under such circumstances, the government would be unlikely to move closer to NATO as well.

Although all major political parties support EC accession, much of the public, most of the Socialist Party, and, indeed, some members of the Prime Minister's Cabinet oppose membership in NATO. Gonzalez himself appears caught between what he earlier advocated—a nonaligned but Western-oriented Spain—and what he now believes circumstances and Spain's interests require—continued membership in NATO, but one which Madrid has made contingent on concurrent membership in the European Community and some movement toward Gibraltar's ultimate repatriation to Spain. The result has been a deliberate ambiguity in Spanish security policy, and Gonzalez will almost certainly defer holding his pledged public referendum on Spain's role in NATO pending further party and public support on the issue and some progress on other elements of Madrid's foreign policy agenda.

While Gonzalez's determination to keep Spain in NATO appears firm, full integration into its military wing is unlikely within the time frame of this Estimate. Gonzalez already faces a formidable task of strengthening the consensus for continued association with the Alliance, and he would be reluctant to make military integration an election issue in 1986. On the other hand, a Spanish withdrawal from NATO—a contingency that we can envisage as a consequence of Europe's unlikely outright rejection of Spain's bid for EC entry—is equally improbable.

The most likely outcome, we believe, will be accession to the EC and continued membership in NATO short of full integration into its military structure. This would appear to be an acceptable interim result

for US and Alliance interests, provided it would lead Spain toward eventual military integration in NATO. US access to Spanish military facilities would continue unimpaired whether Spain joined NATO's military command or remained outside it, although in either case Washington can expect higher Spanish aid requests when the US base agreement is renegotiated. Over the longer term, Spain's full military integration would strengthen NATO's southern flank, providing the Alliance with a valuable military staging ground, additional options for secure lines of communications, supply and logistic support, and a modest but significant addition to the military forces available for Western defense. It would not, however, significantly alter Madrid's restrictive view of the use of its territory for extra-European contingencies.

More problematical for the United States—and for NATO—would be a Spanish offer to participate in NATO's military structure under some special formula limiting Spain's military commitment to the Alliance, particularly if Madrid sought to enlist US aid in fashioning such an arrangement and in winning NATO's acceptance of it. Such an outcome would strengthen the precedent in NATO for conditional membership. Madrid might also be tempted by what it perceives to be Washington's interests in furthering Spain's rapprochement with Europe to urge US intervention to facilitate the EC accession process. Although France is unlikely for political reasons to veto Spain's entry into the EC , it will almost certainly drive a tough bargain in defense of its economic interests. Washington could find itself under subtle pressure from both Paris and Madrid to bear a portion of the costs of Spanish entry by, for example, making concessions on US access to Community markets. Spain, moreover, might renew past efforts to have the United States press Great Britain for compromise on Gibraltar, should recent understandings between Madrid and London on this issue falter.

While we regard Spain's absence from both the EC and NATO, whether by European default or decision in Madrid, as an unlikely prospect, its occurrence would impact negatively on US interests. Indefinite delays in accession and a termination of Spain's role in NATO could be accompanied by a foreign policy more inclined toward its earlier neutralist and pro-Third-World orientation. Traditional Spanish concerns about the threat from North Africa and the development of ties with Latin America and the Arab world could replace Europe as the Socialists' major foreign policy focus, creating the potential for the evolution of foreign policy interests less congruent with those of the United States and the Alliance.

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Even in the unlikely event that perceived rejection by Europe and public pressures force Gonzalez to rethink his government's foreign policy, US-Spanish relations are likely to remain good. Indeed, the initial Spanish reaction to a weakening of its institutional links with Europe would be to strengthen bilateral ties with the United States and European countries to ensure adequate military assistance and continued involvement in Western defense efforts. Spain's rapprochement with Europe will, in any case, be difficult to reverse. Europe is aware of the larger political implications of Spanish membership in the European Community, and Madrid is determined to obtain the long-term advantages of association with both the EC and NATO.

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DISCUSSION

Rapprochement With Europe

1. Spain's evolution during the past quarter century from an underdeveloped dictatorship to an industrialized democracy has been accompanied by an accelerated interest in a "European" foreign policy, symbolized by Madrid's eagerness to enter the European Community and its continued membership in NATO. All major parties support EC accession, and only the Communists have questioned the country's basic allegiance to the West. The public, however, accustomed to traditional Spanish aloofness from continental affairs, remains uninformed and, at best, unenthusiastic about Spain's new Atlantic vocation. West European governments, while unreservedly approving of Spain's return to democracy and encouraging its participation in European institutions, are keenly aware of the economic burdens of Community enlargement. Choices over the next several years, both in Madrid and in Brussels, will determine whether Spain will participate fully in the mainstream of European political and economic affairs.

2. Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez will be the key player in bringing Spain closer to Europe and in securing for Madrid a greater role in world affairs. Behind a successful 1982 electoral campaign that brought him to the head of government was Gonzalez's belief that it was not a time for experimentation and that Spain was not ready for a full-fledged socialist program. Prior to the national election, Gonzalez and his moderate supporters were able to isolate and defeat the Marxist faction within the Socialist Party (PSOE), which under his leadership has largely abandoned its quasi-neutralist postures for a pro-Western and moderate foreign policy. His outlook tempered by a traditional Spanish concept that Madrid can play a special role in world affairs, Gonzalez has emphasized the protection of Spanish geopolitical and economic interests rather than the pursuit of Socialist ideology. That he values good relations with Washington was evidenced by his government's quick ratification of the US-Spanish bilateral agreement negotiated under the previous government. Pragmatism in foreign affairs is also evident in the evolution of his views on Central America. Fashioning himself an expert on the area through his activities in the Socialist International, Gonzalez has moved from dedicated support of the Sandinista revolution to skepticism of Managua's democratic intentions. At the same time, however, Gonzalez remains a firm believer in allowing Latin Americans to determine their own futures, and he will be inclined to listen closely to leaders in the region while remaining critical of some US initiatives.

3. Gonzalez's pragmatism, however, is perhaps best illustrated by his increasingly favorable views on Europe, the EC, and NATO. His long association with European leaders via the Socialist International has strengthened his personal conviction that a modern Spain will require Europeanization. Domestically, accession to the EC has become a preeminent goal of his Socialist government, both as a prerequisite of modernization and, to some extent, a guarantee of continued democratic rule. Notwithstanding this commitment, Gonzalez will not accept EC membership at an exorbitant price and will not be content to wait on Europe's doorstep without some assurance that accession negotiations can be essentially completed (at least as regards the process and timetable for integration) prior to the 1986 legislative elections. His government has also made clear that there would be little chance of military integration into the Atlantic Alliance without EC membership. Hence Madrid has been more circumspect about its final position on NATO, unwilling fully to commit Spain to the defense of a Europe from which it could be economically excluded.

Internal Imperatives

Democracy Taking Root

4. Spain's rapprochement with Europe has been facilitated by its steady, if still fragile, transition to democracy after Franco's death in 1975. Since then, three national elections have been held, the most

recent, in 1982, making Felipe Gonzalez the first Socialist Prime Minister since the 1930s. Gonzalez's electoral appeal, his moderate platform, and the disarray within the conservative and Communist parties have promoted a more open political process that has avoided domination by either the far left or the right. Democratic institutions are taking root in Spain, although the country has not yet reached the West European norm of political stability.

5. Signs of greater political stability are evident in voting trends and the emergence of a multiparty political system. Voting levels have actually increased since the first free elections, and the talk of "disenchantment" with democracy current in the late 1970s has largely dissipated. A coherent party system, dominated by the governing Socialists and the conservative Popular Alliance, has taken root, and there are no significant antidemocratic political parties. The neofascists on the right and the Communists on the left have lost influence and are internally divided. Equally important has been the emergence of the Constitutional Tribunal (Spain's Supreme Court) as an effective arbiter of problems that cannot be resolved in the political arena.

6. The peaceful transfer of power in December 1982 from a center-right government to one headed by the PSOE is perhaps the most important accomplishment of the young democracy. Prime Minister Gonzalez, avoiding ideological politics and doctrinaire Socialist economics, has governed with prudence and moderation. As a consequence, he has been able to garner the strong support of the monarchy and virtually to assure his party's dominance of Spanish politics until the 1986 legislative elections. Given the weakness of both the Communist and conservative elements of the opposition and the absence of a centrist alternative, we believe that he stands a good chance of serving another four-year term.

The Military's Role

7. Despite this progress, extrapolitical forces retain enough residual power to jeopardize the democratic status quo, although the immediacy of any such threat is steadily diminishing. The most powerful of these is the armed forces, for 40 years the bulwark of Franco's dictatorship. The political attitudes of the Spanish officer corps are evolving, but there remains a minority within the military whose ultraconservatism verges on being antidemocratic. Spanish officers generally perceive their ultimate duty to be the defense of "Spain" against both external and internal enemies. Political elites and the public at large are aware that the military's loyalty to democratic institutions and the new Constitution is conditional and that the generals might intervene in politics if they became convinced that the "higher interests" of the nation were threatened.

8. While most senior officers view the Franco era with nostalgia, they are not so isolated from the mainstream of Spanish society and politics as to believe that a military government could successfully turn back the clock. Despite their misgivings about a leftist administration, many top military leaders have come to view Gonzalez with grudging respect. His government's tough line on terrorism, its public praise for the armed forces, and its careful attention to the needs and aspirations of the military have been favorably received by the officer corps. Moreover, the Socialist government has worked closely with the generals in formulating ambitious programs to reform and modernize the Spanish military. Gonzalez's recent appointment of a new team of top military leaders—many of more liberal leaning—will both consolidate these gains and enhance the government's relations with the armed forces. Finally, the military's loyalty to King Juan Carlos—the most respected political figure in Spanish political life and a tenacious defender of democracy—has militated against coup plotting. The King's positive role as a mediator between Gonzalez and the officer corps will remain a key factor in the military's acceptance of democratic rule.

9. A successful military coup would require the near unanimous support of the top military hierarchy and the backing of the King—although we cannot exclude another abortive attempt by a coterie of captains or colonels as occurred in 1981. Only an exceptional combination of crises—a serious surge in terrorism, widespread social disorder, the implementation of radical domestic or foreign policies by the Socialists, and the perceived threat of secession by one or more of the nation's autonomous regions—could create a situation in which the King might lose confidence in Gonzalez's stewardship of the country. Under such circumstances, the military might inter-

vene—but only after the elected government had clearly failed to impose order, no clear democratic alternative was at hand, and the King had decided that the armed forces should act in the interests of Spain. We believe the chances of such a spectacular degeneration of Spanish political life are highly unlikely over the next several years.

The Terrorist Threat

10. A major frustration for Gonzalez has been the persistence of Basque terrorism. Terrorist attacks against the military were a major cause of the abortive coup in February 1981 against the previous government. And ETA, while it cannot realize its goal of an independent Basque nation, seeks to regain the popular support it enjoyed under Franco by provoking a military coup that would enable it to spearhead the opposition to a new dictatorship. Failing that, it probably hopes to elicit a harsh government crackdown that would increase sympathy in the region for the separatist cause. The threat, however, has been diminished by the French Government's recent actions against ETA militants operating from bases in southern France and a weakening of popular sympathy for ETA in the Basque country. Moreover, Madrid's policy of isolating extremists by granting a measure of Basque autonomy has shown modest success in combating ETA. The Basques have already achieved many of their traditional aspirations, including the establishment of a regional government with control over taxation and education, the beginnings of a Basque police force, and the right to use the Basque language for conducting official business.

11. The recent upsurge in ETA violence, in the face of government efforts to remove the sources of separatist support, has also sparked greater public revulsion to terrorism, further isolating the extremists from most Basque nationalists. ETA's adamant refusal even temporarily to lay down its arms and negotiate with Madrid has led the Gonzalez government to adopt tough counterterrorist measures that have won public endorsement and prevented the problem from significantly escalating. Nevertheless, ETA will probably respond to increased police pressure by stepping up its attacks in the short term to demonstrate that it has not been defeated. While the chances of an outright coup are small, so long as ETA retains the capability to target prominent officials—such as Gonzalez, the King, top generals, or Cabinet ministers—the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. The more immediate danger, however, is that the military and security forces—which have borne the brunt of ETA violence and are highly sensitive to threats of separatism—might use terrorism as a pretext to meddle in politics.

The Economy

12. The most immediate and intractable problem for the Gonzalez government remains the state of the economy. Real economic growth remained sluggish from 1975 to 1982, averaging just 1.6 percent annually, while the unemployment rate more than doubled from 4.7 percent in 1975 to 17.0 percent in 1982—the second highest in Europe. Although the Socialists rode to power promising action to cure Spain's economic ills and treat its rampant unemployment, Gonzalez has adopted a cautious economic program that has shown positive but less than dramatic results. The economy registered a moderate improvement in 1983, growing by 2.1 percent, but unemployment rose to 18.4 percent and shows few signs of falling. So far, the only positive indicator of the economy's revitalization has been a 2-percent drop in the inflation rate, from 14 percent in 1982 to 12 percent in 1983, and a modest upturn in export growth. Last year's strong export performance—reflecting a large gain in competitiveness and the economic recovery in the United States—has prompted both Madrid and the OECD to raise their estimates of 1983 GDP growth to over 2 percent.

13. If West European economic activity picks up next year as expected, we believe that exports could continue to stage a strong performance, boosting real economic growth to at least 2.2 percent—the highest since 1977. This will continue to reduce the rate of increase of unemployment, but the latter will not actually decline in 1984 and possibly not in 1985. To further moderate the growth of the jobless rate beyond 1984, the Socialists have begun to revise rigid labor laws that discouraged firms from hiring new workers, and the government has shifted part of the burden of social security taxes away from employers. The government has also indicated its intention to tighten monetary policy if the trade unions do not accept real wage cuts in 1984.

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Economic Indicators

	1981	1982	1983 [a]	1984 [b]
Real GDP [c]	0.4	1.3	2.1	2.2
Real private consumption [c]	−1.3	0.4	0.9	1.0
Real gross fixed investment [c]	−5.2	−1.8	−1.1	1.5
Export volume [c]	7.9	7.0	7.5	7.5
Import volume [c]	−4.0	3.4	0.0	3.0
Current account balance [d]	−5.0	−4.1	−2.5	−1.5
Consumer price inflation [e]	14.5	14.4	12.1	9.5
Percentage of unemployment	15.4	17.1	18.4	18.8
General government balance [f]	3.5	6.0	6.0	5.5
Value of currency [g]	92.3	110.0	143.4	170.0

[a] Preliminary.
[b] Projected.
[c] Percent of change from year earlier.
[d] Billion US dollars.
[e] Year over year.
[f] Expressed as a percentage of GDP.
[g] Pesetas per US dollar.

14. On the down side, the industrial restructuring program—which calls for trimming the work force in traditional industries—and the government's commitment to pursuing conservative economic policies will probably erode the Socialists' support on the left. Both the Communist and Socialist trade unions almost certainly will continue to stage strikes to protest job cutbacks. A sharp increase in joblessness, massive strikes and demonstrations, and a general escalation of social tensions could weaken Gonzalez's control of his government as well as his influence with the electorate. We believe that such a turn of events is unlikely. And, while the economy remains the Achilles' heel of the Socialist government, we do not expect domestic economic factors to have a major impact on Gonzalez's political fortunes or on Spain's future relationship with Europe.

Spain and the European Community

The Economic Case

15. Although there is no consensus in Madrid on how accession could affect the overall health of the Spanish economy, the repercussions of membership will be considerable. The liberalization of trade will both open up Spain's highly protected economy to increased foreign competition and provide Spanish exporters with greater access to EC markets. The price of entry, moreover, will necessitate a restructuring of industry, agriculture, and finance—a more difficult task at a time when Spanish industry is still suffering from the effects of worldwide recession and high double-digit unemployment—but a necessary and positive process, whether Spain joins the Community or not.

16. The liberalization of trade following accession will have its most immediate impact on Spanish industry. While the EC's already low barriers to Spanish exports will be dropped, the lifting of highly protective tariffs on EC products will expose small, inefficient Spanish firms to more intense foreign competition and, unless mergers or acquisitions take place, drive many of them into bankruptcy. In recognition of the rigors of foreign competition, the Socialists are continuing the previous government's efforts to reduce capacity, eliminate job redundancies, and provide investment incentives to restructure these sectors into more efficient producers. The social costs of restructuring, however, could be as high as the elimination of 20 percent of existing jobs in the affected companies. An even larger share of the work force could be trimmed after accession if Madrid is obliged to adhere to the EC's restructuring program, and the Socialist government's promises to retrain displaced laborers will not alleviate what is likely to be a rising unemployment rate.

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17. Agriculture is likely to fare better than industry in the short term, even though EC barriers to Spanish produce will be lowered only gradually after accession is achieved. Spanish agriculture is highly competitive and could prosper in the EC market, especially once export restraints are removed. In particular, the fruit and vegetable market—which accounts for 80 percent of Spain's agricultural production—would eventually be helped by accession. In the highly protected olive oil sector, however, Spain's adherence to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will increase domestic consumption of cheaper vegetable oils and exacerbate its existing olive oil surplus. Madrid will also be expected to pay more for its agricultural imports, by adopting

EC market prices and instituting import levies on non-EC agricultural products. Despite these obstacles, Madrid would probably achieve both a net inflow of EC funds and a small agricultural trade surplus.

18. On balance, the modest but increasing benefits for Spanish agriculture from Community accession would probably not fully offset the more immediate damage to Spanish industry caused by cheaper manufactured imports from Western Europe. But while the first years of EC membership may prove difficult, in the long run both Spain's agriculture and industry stand to gain from greater exposure to EC competition, greater access to EC markets, and the probable flow of European high technology to Spain. Even in the industrial sector—where the shock of accession would be greatest—the lure of foreign markets, the greater incentives for foreign investments after accession, and Spain's relatively lower labor costs could offer a major stimulant to the economy. Membership, moreover, will bring with it the prospect of EC assistance, especially regional development funds, that should ensure that Madrid is a net recipient of EC budget funds.

Problems and Prospects of Accession

19. The European Community is committed to enlargement but troubled by its costs. Four years of negotiations leading to accession have been frustrated by the EC's failure to agree among themselves on many issues affecting Spain—including new rules for Mediterranean farm products which France has insisted should be settled before opening talks with Spain. Many of the secondary issues have been settled, but the last two EC summits in Stuttgart and Athens failed to overcome disagreements on EC budget and Common Agricultural Policy reforms that are complicating the enlargement issue.

20. Spanish entry into the EC is likely to acquire greater prominence during 1984. The French EC presidency will advance or retard accession prospects, depending on the progress it achieves in resolving the Community's internal problems—primarily British and German demands for a redistribution of budget shares to lessen their financial burden—and in reaching agreement on agricultural reforms that would avert the virtual bankruptcy of the CAP price support system. Thus, while negotiations with Spain are caught up in this impasse, the Community's need to save the CAP system should provide the necessary impetus for at least a temporary formula for distributing budget burdens and trimming agricultural spending by mid-1984.

21. The prospects for Spanish accession will be determined primarily by ongoing negotiations on farm and fisheries issues. The French and the Italians have the most at stake in agriculture, and both have proposed transition periods of up to 10 to 12 years for Spain's most competitive farm products. The French, in particular, have reportedly insisted on special arrangements to protect French agricultural interests. An eventual agreement on agriculture between Madrid and its future EC partners, however, appears more promising, now that the EC has adopted new rules on fruit and vegetable price supports; and protection for southern European agriculture will probably be found in a slower reduction of the EC's barriers against Spanish farm products, which would mark a modest concession by the Gonzalez government. Settlement of the fisheries question will be more difficult, given the size of the Spanish fleet and the determination of EC members to see it reduced. Madrid will probably have to accede to such demands from the British, the French, and the Danes, who have been the most skeptical supporters of Spain's entry. While the question of Gibraltar had posed a barrier to EC accession, recent bilateral understandings between Madrid and London have apparently resolved the issue, at least within the EC accession context.

22. Spain's accession to the EC will be bedeviled not only by its terms, but also by its timing. Madrid's flexibility on the terms of entry will, in the final analysis, be determined by its awareness that for Spain there is no attractive economic alternative to the EC. The low tariffs currently governing Spanish exports to the Community will almost certainly be raised if enlargement negotiations collapse. Spanish claims that it can replace EC trade—roughly half its total trade—with new markets in Latin America, Japan, the United States, or the Middle East is also mostly bluster. Moreover, EC accession would be a political coup for the Socialists, and greatly increase the Prime Minister's maneuvering room on NATO membership.

23. The timing of accession remains by far the most vexing problem. Gonzalez hopes to achieve entry by

January 1986, prior to legislative elections that year—an objective which will require completion of negotiations by no later than early 1985. Although we judge this prospect more probable than other scenarios, the complexity of the issues and the clash of national economic interests within the Community could well delay negotiations beyond that date. Gonzalez, in our view, might be prepared to accept slippage in the accession date if he could confidently assure the public of entry during what he expects will be his second term, from 1986 to 1990. Should negotiations simply founder indefinitely on issues acknowledged by both sides to be too difficult to resolve, we believe that Gonzalez would be prepared to suspend or abort the negotiations altogether. Failure to gain accession under such circumstances would be perceived by the public as a rejection by Europe, and Gonzalez might be forced to make a dramatic gesture to demonstrate that Spain will not remain Europe's suitor indefinitely. This would greatly complicate the government's efforts to keep Spain in NATO as well.

Spain and NATO

24. Since taking office, Gonzalez has frozen the process of Spain's military integration in the Alliance [1] and publicly linked continued association with NATO with progress toward the repatriation of Gibraltar and membership in the European Community. Having charged the former government with joining NATO without consulting the Spanish people, he also promised to hold a public referendum on Spain's role in NATO; and the issue will remain a politically sensitive one for Gonzalez until he fulfills that pledge. Achieving consensus on the matter will not be easy. Much of the public, most of the Socialist Party, and, indeed, some members of Gonzalez's Cabinet oppose NATO membership.

25. Spanish elite opinion is just beginning to come to grips with the NATO issue. The debate thus far has engaged relatively few—and these at the extremes of political opinion. On the center right is a small group of convinced Atlanticists—now for the most part members of the Popular Alliance and the Popular Democratic Party—who brought Spain into NATO in 1982 and would like to see its full integration into the military command irrespective of the progress of Spain's negotiations with the European Community. On the left, a larger and more determined group of anti-NATO ideologues—in the Communist Party and the left wing of the PSOE—are irrevocably opposed to Spanish participation in the Alliance, also without regard to Spain's relationship to the EC. The roots of the debate lie deep in traditions of Spanish neutrality, 40 years of isolation from the European mainstream, and the perception that the major threat to Spain emanates from the south rather than from Warsaw Pact moves into Central Europe. Although the Spanish, and the military in particular, are troubled by the growing Soviet naval presence in the western Mediterranean and the eastern Atlantic and the possible Soviet use of certain North African states as surrogates, their major concern is a Moroccan move against the Spanish North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Among those who view the "Europeanization" of Spain as long overdue, there are many who believe the objective would be better accomplished by accession to the European Community rather than to NATO.

26. As democratic Spain has more closely identified itself with the West and as relations with Morocco have improved, more traditional Spanish attitudes have begun to erode. Although a broad consensus on the advisability of continued participation in the Alliance has not yet formed, considerable pro-NATO sentiment has surfaced in center-left groups not ideologically opposed to the idea of a common Western defense. NATO supporters focus on how Alliance membership can help Spain achieve its other key foreign policy goals, arguing that any precipitate withdrawal from NATO would kill any chance of meaningful negotiations with Great Britain over the eventual repatriation of Gibraltar and would certainly hamper, if not terminate, progress toward EC accession. The notion that NATO membership will give Spain's military an external mission and help divert its attention from internal politics is also gaining adherents. It is also becoming evident to more pragmatic converts to Atlanticism that as a third-class power Spain can exert much more influence on European and world affairs from within the Alliance than

[1] Spain's participation in NATO's military structure remains limited. It has assigned liaison officers to the Military Committee and observers to meetings of the Nuclear Planning Group. Spanish representatives also participate in the Eurogroup, Defense Planning Committee, and a variety of technical and armaments committees and working groups.

outside it. They argue that the sharing of intelligence among NATO allies provides Spain with information vital to its national security and that full military integration will expedite the modernization of Spanish defense forces.

27. The opponents of NATO membership contend that such benefits are counterbalanced by significant costs. Among the most persistent themes in the NATO debate is that the so-called railroading of Spain into NATO in 1982 against the wishes of both Communists and Socialists turned membership into a divisive issue, pitting left against right and inhibiting the gradual formation of a national consensus on defense policy. Opponents also charge that, in its unseemly haste to join the Alliance, the previous Calvo-Sotelo government relinquished a valuable bargaining chip in the EC and Gibraltar negotiations. Another school of thought—previously associated with Foreign Minister Fernando Moran—claims that Spain's world influence would be greater outside the Alliance, since NATO membership involves a loss of foreign policy "autonomy." Others maintain that, by joining the Alliance, Spain gratuitously acquires a new set of enemies, thereby worsening the nation's overall security. Moreover, in view of the threat from the south, the noninclusion of Ceuta and Melilla in the NATO area negates the value of the NATO link. They also question the need for an expensive military modernization program tied to Alliance membership, maintaining that the country's defenses and ongoing US-Spanish military cooperation outside the NATO context are sufficient to deter the few potential enemies a non-NATO Spain might have to face.

Outlook for the Spain-NATO Link

28. With respect to NATO, Gonzalez appears caught between his earlier rhetoric urging a nonaligned but Western-oriented Spain and what he now believes circumstances and Spain's interests require—the maintenance of the status quo vis-a-vis the Alliance. In the face of domestic and external pressures, he has sought to balance his leftist constituency on the one hand and Spain's powerful conservative interest groups and the European allies on the other. The result has been a deliberate ambiguity in security policy, permitting a certain freedom of maneuver on other Alliance policies, while remaining in NATO and associating Spain with the West.

29. We believe that Gonzalez is determined to keep Spain in the Alliance and has begun laying the groundwork for persuading the rest of the country of the merits of this course. To achieve the immediate goal of maintaining the status quo vis-a-vis NATO, Gonzalez must overcome residual resistance within the government itself to continued Alliance membership; he must convince the Socialist party to alter its longstanding disapproval of Spanish participation in NATO; and he must either finesse or fulfill his pledge to consult the public on the matter.

30. ***Government-Party Pressures.*** While the Socialist Party is officially opposed to NATO, the PSOE's leadership is divided on the issue. Like the military, some leaders appear to have backed off from earlier skepticism that NATO membership would add measurably to Spanish security. A small but influential group—including Defense Minister Narciso Serra, Economics Minister Miguel Boyer, and some members of the party's Executive Committee—believes it is in Spain's long-term interest to be in NATO. Foreign Minister Moran's anti-NATO attitudes appear to be softening, although not yet to the extent of accepting Spain's full military integration. The most potentially disruptive opposition to NATO could come from Deputy Prime Minister Guerra, but it is unlikely that he would jeopardize his close friendship with Gonzalez and his position within the PSOE over the NATO issue. Guerra, and the remaining ministers, will almost certainly accept the Prime Minister's decision—if only for the sake of party unity and political expediency.

31. Converting the party rank and file to the merits of NATO membership will pose a greater challenge. Polls reflect persistent and strong public opposition to NATO, and party cadres remain concerned about the impact of continued membership on future electoral prospects. However, although generally distrustful of the Alliance and still resentful over the way Spanish participation was achieved, many in the party are beginning to assimilate the arguments being made in Spain in favor of NATO. A determined campaign by Gonzalez could, in our view, elicit party approval for NATO membership, particularly if it coincided with an announcement of at least a tentative date for accession to the EC. This would enable the government to portray NATO membership simply as the military dimension of a wider political and economic integration of Spain into Europe. Finally, Gonzalez's

trump cards—effective whether played or not—are the implied threats to leave office or call for early elections should the party or the public fail to ratify his foreign policy. If forced to choose, the PSOE would almost certainly sacrifice ideological purity to retain its charismatic, vote-getting leader and the prospect of four more years in power.

32. ***Public Opinion and the Referendum.*** If Gonzalez can persuade the party—a challenge, in our view, no more formidable than the one he faced in 1979 when he wrenched the PSOE from its Marxist moorings—turning around public opinion would be considerably easier. His ability to accomplish the task—indeed, even his willingness to try—will depend on how well he is able to demonstrate progress toward accomplishing other key elements of his foreign policy agenda, including movement toward accession to the European Community.

33. Although the Spanish political elite is beginning to calculate—and debate—the costs and benefits of Alliance membership on its merits, Spain's marginal role in world affairs over the past two centuries has accentuated the average Spaniard's inward-looking perspective. Insofar as the public focuses on the issue, it associates NATO with East-West confrontation and "Bloc politics," both of which have highly negative connotations. Among publics polled in West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, Spanish respondents were considerably more likely to favor unilateral nuclear disarmament and to oppose any use of nuclear weapons; and they were much less likely to see the Soviet military buildup as a cause of current international tensions. Other polls report more than half the Spanish public opposed to NATO membership. These same polls suggest, however, that the public's opposition to NATO is not so strongly held that it cannot be changed. More than three-fourths of the respondents readily acknowledge themselves poorly informed on NATO affairs; and, when queried on national priorities, Spaniards invariably rank NATO a secondary issue, overshadowed by the economy, terrorism, regional autonomy, and EC accession.

34. Gonzalez will almost certainly have to fulfill his pledge to consult the public on Spain's role in NATO, although he will seek to retain some flexibility, with respect to both timing and method. Gonzalez's announced intention to hold a referendum on NATO in 1985 was prompted by the need to maintain cohesion within his own party and deflect criticism from party leftists pressing for a referendum date. It may also have been an attempt to let "Europe" know the limits of Spanish patience on EC accession. Despite this public commitment, we think it unlikely that he will seek public endorsement of NATO membership until he believes that the odds are heavily in his favor. At a mimimum, this would require progress on EC accession and time to educate a poorly informed electorate to help blunt or modify public opposition to NATO. The Prime Minister could delay action by arguing that serious East-West tensions impede dispassionate debate and that a referendum could harm the interests of the West. He will find it difficult, however, to avoid some form of public consultation, since this would alienate his own party and give the Communists a powerful campaign theme.

35. Gonzalez could postpone the referendum until after the legislative elections in 1986 or seek to fulfill his pledge to consult the public by incorporating a pro-NATO plank into the PSOE's campaign platform and billing the election as a referendum on all his policies—including continued NATO membership. Managing the political flack that could result would be difficult but not impossible. Moreover, if a referendum is held, the voters probably will not be asked to pronounce unambiguously for or against NATO. Gonzalez, for example, might artfully cast the issue in terms of seeking public endorsement of his government's policy of integration into Europe, including EC accession, any progress made on the repatriation of Gibraltar, and its present Alliance standing. Alternatively, he could ask Spaniards to choose between continued political membership or military integration into the Alliance, although we believe he is likely to avoid foreclosing the option of future Spanish participation in NATO's military structure. To pose the question prematurely—or too explicitly—until a wider consensus for political integration in Europe has developed would divide the party, confuse the public, and help the Communists. Under such circumstances, and if Gonzalez were willing to commit his personal and political prestige to the issue, the government would be able to obtain the requisite popular approval. It will face little organized opposition: the parties of the center and right want to keep Spain in the Alliance,

and the mobilizing capacity of the Communists—little more than 7 to 9 percent of the electorate—has been further reduced by internal divisions and the emergence of a pro-Soviet rival party.

A Range of Outcomes

36. There are three possible outcomes for the Spain-NATO link in the two- to three-year perspective of this Estimate: further military integration in NATO prior to the 1986 elections, total withdrawal, or a continuation of the status quo. The chances of the first, we believe, are highly unlikely. Gonzalez already faces a formidable task of winning party and public approval for continued association with the Alliance. This is likely to remain his foremost priority, and he hopes to resolve it by late 1985 in order to preempt NATO's becoming an issue during the general election a year later. Gonzalez, moreover, will not want to expose himself to Communist charges of having further betrayed Spain's foreign policy "autonomy" by hastening the process of military integration.

37. The scenario for Spanish withdrawal from the Alliance is less clear. A prolonged delay in EC accession would, at a minimum, preclude any movement toward Spanish military integration. Short of a complete collapse of the negotiations, however, we think it unlikely that the government would withdraw from NATO. Should Spain fail to achieve Community membership by 1986, Gonzalez, in our view, would be more likely to delay final resolution of the Spain-NATO link than to sever it completely. The promised public consultation could either be canceled or, more probably, deferred until prospects for enlargement were brighter. Should an abrogation of the talks with the EC foreclose entirely the prospect of Spanish accession, Gonzalez would find it difficult to muster the party and public support necessary either to change the PSOE's platform or win a referendum on NATO. He could well decide that bowing to domestic pressures to take Spain out of the Alliance was the only way to assure his continued control of the Socialist party and his reelection as head of government. This rejection by Europe would all but end Spain's incipient Atlantic vocation.

38. By far the most likely outcome for the Spain-NATO link is continued association without military integration through 1986. This could result from a successful referendum, from a decision to fold the referendum into the general election, or from the indefinite postponement or cancellation of the public consultation. In any case, Gonzalez's reasons for delaying formal military integration will be more pragmatic than ideological. The lack of an independent nuclear deterrent makes a permanent "French solution" for Spain improbable, although Madrid might seek some special formula limiting Spain's military commitment to the Alliance. Furthermore, the government is aware that the most prominent of NATO benefits—military modernization—can best be achieved only within the Alliance's military structure. But even if Spain acceeds to the Community by January 1986, we believe that there will be little progress toward formal military integration until after the election. At that point, with NATO a less controversial issue and the non-Communist public and parties grudgingly reconciled to Alliance membership, we foresee a second Socialist administration or a center-right government well positioned to seek full NATO membership for Spain.

The Soviet Interest

39. The USSR has evinced little interest in Spain's EC negotiations, largely because the Soviets view the Community as little more than a customs union and prefer to deal bilaterally with EC members, but also because the USSR's commercial relations with Spain are negligible. By contrast, Moscow has roundly denounced Spanish membership in NATO as a provocation and a serious alteration of the balance of power. Although apparently resigned to the Spanish Government's evident desire to remain in NATO and to consider future integration into its military structure, Moscow has sought to drive a wedge between Spain and the United States and its European allies by publicly pledging that the USSR would not target nuclear missiles against Spain if it remains "denuclearized." Moscow, however, is probably less concerned with Spain's modest potential contribution to NATO's firepower than with the political implications of a new member for the Alliance—the first since West Germany joined in 1955.

40. The USSR's ability to influence the Spanish decision on NATO, however, is minimal. The recent formation in Spain of an explicitly pro-Soviet splinter Communist party has given the USSR another channel

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to express its views on NATO within the context of domestic Spanish politics, but the stridently pro-Moscow nature of the new party will limit its credibility and influence. While Moscow might benefit from any destabilizing actions by ETA that would divert the government's attention from NATO, there is no evidence of Soviet control over Basque terrorism.

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However, Soviet-inspired charges in the Spanish press that the CIA is waging a campaign against Foreign Minister Moran—reputedly among the most negatively inclined in the government toward fuller NATO integration for Spain—is known to have caused concern. When in 1981 the USSR made veiled public threats to take reprisals if Spain joined NATO, the tactic backfired, producing a strong government condemnation of Soviet intimidation. Any repetition of such methods would aid Gonzalez, helping him to establish that only the totalitarian USSR—and the Spanish political forces responsive to its interests—opposes a sovereign Spanish decision to participate in the joint defense of Western democracy. However, the Soviets probably will pursue a less heavyhanded campaign to keep the issue of Spanish involvement in East-West conflicts before the public. This effort might marginally reduce Gonzalez's chances of convincing the electorate to accept NATO.

Implications for the United States

41. Spain's full integration in both NATO's military defense structure and in the European Community would best serve US and European interests and, we judge, those of Madrid as well—although we believe accession to the EC more likely than military integration in NATO within the time frame of this Estimate. Spain's military integration and its geostrategic location would strengthen NATO's southern flank, providing the Alliance with a valuable military staging ground; additional options for secure lines of communications, supply, and logistic support; and a modest but significant addition to the military forces available for Western defense.[2] Full participation in both the Alliance and the Community would be a symbol of Spain's commitment to democracy and, to some extent, a guarantor of its political stability; it would also be confirmation of Madrid's intention to overcome its long separation from the mainstream of European affairs and an implicit acknowledgment that, for modern Spain, isolation and neutralism are ineffective national strategies. On the other hand, whenever formal talks for Spanish military integration begin, they will almost certainly be long and arduous. The NATO role (if any) of Gibraltar and vexing command problems regarding national responsibilities in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean will need to be resolved with Portugal and other Allies. Interservice rivalries will make the delineation of a satisfactory military mission for Spain a sensitive political matter, and previously enunciated preferences for a fourth major NATO command for Spain will require difficult negotiations with NATO.

42. On the other hand, Spain's complete withdrawal from NATO—a circumstance that we can envisage only as a consequence of an outright rejection by Europe of Spain's bid for EC entry—would have damaging implications for the United States and the Alliance. While NATO's military posture would not be affected by Spain's withdrawal, it would raise questions about the Alliance's political cohesion, and imply that efforts to broaden the Alliance were both futile and potentially destabilizing. If Spain were to reject NATO as a consequence of its own rejection by the European Community, it could prove a setback to US interests in strengthening West European political unity and economic institutions.

43. The longer term effects of Spain's backing away from Europe would probably include a Spanish foreign policy that would be more inclined toward its earlier neutralist and pro–Third World orientation. Under Franco and his immediate successors, Spanish foreign policy was predicated on the US connection and alleged "special relationships" with Latin America and the Arab world. Were Spain to believe itself rejected by the Continent, these traditional Spanish concerns could replace Europe as the Socialists'—and much of the center right's—major foreign policy focus, creating the potential for the evolution of Spanish foreign policy interests in the Third World (especially Central America) less congruent with those of the United States and the Alliance.

[2] See annex for discussion of the potential Spanish military contribution to NATO.

44. Should rejection by Europe and public pressures force Gonzalez to rethink his government's foreign policy, bilateral US-Spanish relations would be complicated, but US military interests in the Iberian Peninsula would not be immediately affected. Spain is too large and strategically important to be an unarmed neutral, and its economy and armaments industry is insufficiently developed to mount a credible deterrent of its own. Madrid would have no satisfactory military alternative to the US connection. Access to the four major US military bases in Spain would probably not be changed, although Madrid would almost certainly request higher aid levels when the US-Spanish agreement was renegotiated. Indeed, neither would full integration into NATO's military structure alter significantly US-Spanish bilateral military relations. Spain's traditional tight control of US use of the bases for extra-European operations would persist whether Spain were in or outside NATO's military wing. Spanish sensitivities are likely to remain particularly acute regarding the Middle East where, notwithstanding the current government's moves toward recognizing Israel, Spain seeks to preserve its close ties with a wide variety of Arab states.

45. The most probable midterm outcome to Spain's negotiations with Europe—accession to the EC and membership in NATO short of formal integration in its military wing—would continue the "Europeanization" of Madrid's foreign policy, improve bilateral ties with the United States, and foster political stability and democratic institutions at home. More problematical for the United States, however, would be a Spanish offer to participate in NATO's military structure under some special formula limiting its military commitment to the Alliance—particularly if Madrid sought to enlist our aid in fashioning such an arrangement and in winning NATO's acceptance of it. Any such outcome would strengthen the tendency in NATO for conditional membership.

46. Moreover, the longer Spain holds further commitment to the Alliance in some sense hostage to assurance on EC entry, the greater could be Madrid's temptation to use what it perceives to be Washington's interests in furthering Spain's rapprochement with Europe to urge US intervention to facilitate the accession process. While we believe that France ultimately will agree to Spanish entry into the EC for political reasons, it is likely to drive a tough bargain to protect French agricultural interests; and Washington could find itself under subtle pressure from both Paris and Madrid to bear a portion of the costs of Spanish entry by making, for example, appropriate concessions on US access to Community markets. Madrid, moreover, might also renew past efforts to have the United States press Great Britain for compromise on the Gibraltar dispute—an issue complicating NATO, if not for the moment EC, membership.

47. US-Spanish relations are likely to remain good, even in the unlikely event that perceived rejection by Europe and public pressures force Gonzalez to rethink his government's foreign policy. Indeed, the initial Spanish reaction to a weakening of its institutional links with Europe would be to strengthen bilateral ties with the United States and European countries to ensure adequate military assistance and continued involvement in Western defense efforts. Spain's rapprochement with Europe will, in any case, be difficult to reverse. Europe is aware of the larger political implications of Spanish membership in the European Community, while Madrid recognizes the long-term advantages of Spanish association with the EC and NATO.

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Spain's Strategic Location



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ANNEX

THE SPANISH ARMED FORCES

Spanish membership in NATO brings to the Alliance a country with the third-largest land area and fifth-largest population in Western Europe. With some 360,000 men, the armed forces are larger than most European NATO militaries—only Turkey, West Germany, France, and Italy have more men under arms. Spain has a well-developed, reasonably modern industrial base and the capability to produce high-quality armaments and to coproduce more sophisticated weapon systems. Real increase in defense spending, estimated at 4.8 percent in 1983 and projected at 4.6 percent for 1984, is the highest growth rate in NATO. Spanish defense spending, converted to the NATO definition, is roughly 2.5 percent of GDP; the European NATO average is about 3.8 percent.

Spain's key contributions to NATO are its territory and facilities, with their potential for use as reinforcement or staging areas both in a European war and in time of tension or conflict outside the NATO area, although its value for such purposes is limited by Madrid's restrictive view of the use of its territory for out-of-area contingencies. Because of its distance from Central Europe, the Iberian Peninsula would provide a secure rear area for logistic support in wartime and a good reception point for reinforcements from North America. Air and naval forces based in Spain and the Balearic Islands would be in a strong position to counter the Soviet Navy in the western Mediterranean and the approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. However, there is little indication that Spanish holdings in the Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla would extend NATO's assets beyond the European theater and, in the case of the Canaries, allow NATO to control sea traffic along the west coast of Africa.

The Spanish armed forces can make a modest but useful contribution to the conventional capability of the Alliance. The almost 60,000-man Navy is relatively modern in equipment and outlook. It has exercised oten with other Alliance navies and operates regularly in the areas it is most likely to cover for NATO. The 42,000-man Air Force is a small but capable service, ready for integration into NATO plans. Spain's air defense surveillance system has recently been upgraded and is now compatible with the French system as well as the NATO network. Although the Army is large—about 260,000 men—it is plagued by problems such as inadequate training, equipment deficiencies, and an archaic command structure which will limit its effectiveness in a NATO context. All three services, however, have ambitious modernization programs, which, if carried through, should improve their capabilities markedly during the next decade.

Among the most significant contributions Spanish forces could make during their first few years in the Alliance are:

- *Sea Control Missions.* Under NATO, the Spanish Navy could work in concert with Allied forces to patrol the western Mediterranean, the Bay of Biscay, and the Atlantic approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar—areas in which it already operates. In peacetime, Spanish antisubmarine warfare units could assist in monitoring Soviet submarine traffic in and near the Strait, and its ASW helicopters and maritime partrol aircraft could contribute to NATO's air surveillance mission there. During wartime, the Navy could play an important part in guarding Allied ships transporting troops and supplies from North America as they neared their European terminus. The major Soviet naval threat to this area in the initial stages of a NATO–Warsaw Pact war probably would be from small numbers of submarines deployed near Gibraltar to attack high-value NATO targets such as aircraft carriers and merchantmen. Spanish ASW forces, integrated with those of other Western navies, could make a small but significant contribution to the effort to search out and destroy Soviet submarines.
- *Presence Missions.* Battalion-sized or squadron-sized ground and air units could be made available for use with the ACE Mobile Force (AMF), a multinational organization intended to deploy

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rapidly to the Northern or Southern Flanks to demonstrate NATO's resolve in periods of tension. Madrid could earmark a squadron of Air Force air defense or attack aircraft for AMF operations.

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